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Deficits versus Differences: African American Children's 
Linguistic Paths towards a Theory of Mind 
Brenda A. Allen, Jill de Villiers & Samantha Fran1;ois0 
Smith College, Tulane University0 
1. Introduction
Historically, African American children's development has been
characterized mostly in terms of deficits. Language acquisition is no exception 
(Bereiter and Engelman, 1966; Deutsch, 1967; Hall and Nagy, 1987a; Hall and 
Nagy, 1987b; Hall, Scholnick and Hughes, 1987; Hart and Risley, 1995). In 
general, these researchers argue that there are basic deficits in the amount and 
complexity of the language used especially in low-income African American 
homes. It is thus argued that low-income African American children's language 
development suffers from insufficient input and that such inadequacies result in 
other cognitive delays (Bereiter and Engleman, 1966; Deutsch, 1967; Hall and 
Risley, 1995). 
The development of a theory of mind is one such cognitive skill that has 
been purported to show developmental delays in low-income African American 
populations because of the presumed deficiencies in language. It is argued that 
the development of a mature theory of mind depends upon socialization 
experiences conveyed in large part by language about the mind and more 
specifically talk about others' mental states (Astington, 1992; Astington and 
Jenkins, 1995; Brown and Dunn, 1991; de Villiers and de Villiers, 2000; de 
Villiers and Pyers, 1997; Gopnik and Slaughter, 1991). Many of the studies on 
the differential amount of talk about mental states in African American homes 
relative to the amount of talk about mental states in the homes of their white 
middle-class counterparts bore out earlier claims of deficiencies. For example, a 
current analysis of the use of mental verbs in the Hall (CHILDES, 1984) 
samples of Black and White middle-class and working-class families produced 
the graph shown in Figure 1. Thus, it is not surprising that when theory of mind 
studies such as that conducted by Holmes, Black and Miller (1996) show 
African American children's performance to be delayed relative to their White 
middle-class counterparts, the presumption of language deprivation in the home 
becomes the ready explanation. 
The present paper raises one of many major problems with the past research. 
More specifically, the question is raised with regard to how the presumption of 
language deficits has been studied, especially the use of language deemed 
necessary for the development of a theory of mind. The data used to argue that 
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there �re deficits in the quality of language encountered in working-class African 
Amencan households, namely the reduced frequency of references to the mind 
and mental states, results from language transcripts where simple counts of 
me�tal verb usage are recorded for different race/class groups. While such a 
codmg scheme l�nds a gross measure of mental verb usage, it tells us nothing 
about the s�n�actlc s!ructures in which such verbs were used. Yet recent theories 
argue that 1t 1s not Just the amount of mental verb usage that is the necessary 
�recursor to the development of a theory of mind. Rather, it is maintained that it
1s _the mastery of complement sentences with mental verbs that enable the 
ul!1�ate development of a theo�y. of mind (Astington and Jenkins, 1995; de
Villiers and Pyers, 1997; de y1lhers and de Villiers, 2000). The theory of 
c_om�le?1ent sentences also mcludes communication verbs as a possible 
hngms�1c route to a theory of mind because such verbs allow for the same 
syntactic structures as mental verbs (Astington and Jenkins 1997· de Villier 
and Pyers, 1997; de Villiers and de Villiers, 2000). 
' ' s 
Figure 1. Frequency of Parent's Use of "Mental Verbs" by Race/Class 
Groups 
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�h�s, the present investigation challenged the traditional analyses by
exammmg the _use of both mental and communication verbs within complement
sentenc�s by different race/class groups. Moreover, such usage was recorded for
both children a�d parents: It was hypothesized that the differences in gross
usage observed m the earlier studies may have been artifactual in that much of 
th� �oded us�ge of �ental verbs may have resulted from more routinized or 
op1mon �arkmg use m some groups (i.e.,"I don't know" or "I think I will have
an apple ). Such usage would not be pertinent to the socialization around 
mental states. 




